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Abuse of Process
Tobi Goldoftas*

A

BUSE OF PROCESS is

the tort that is said to exist when an indi-

vidual obtains an advantage in litigation over his opponent
through the malicious and unfounded use of some regular legal
process or procedure.' Prosser states that tort action for abuse
of process may be maintained if the legal process, whether criminal or civil, is used against another to accomplish a purpose for
which it was not designed.2 This is considered a tortious act for
which the offender may be compelled to answer in damages.3
However, note that the proper use of this legal process (even
though used for a bad intention and to satisfy malicious intentions) is not actionable. 4 Confusion of abuse of process with the
separate tort of malicious prosecution is common, and very troublesome.
Abuse of process is not the act of starting an unjustified action. Rather it is the misuse or misapplication of process for an
5
end other than that which it was designed to accomplish. In
an action for abuse of process, the defendant need not prove that
the proceeding terminated in his favor, nor that it was obtained
without probable cause 6 or in the course of a proceeding begun
without probable cause.
All of the following elements must be present in order to
sustain an action for abuse of process: (1) the defendant must
have made an illegal, perverted, improper use of the process-a
* B.S., M.S., Michigan State University; Associate Editor, Hydraulics &
Pneumatics Magazine, Industrial Publishing Co. of Cleveland; Second-year
student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 Black's Law Dictionary, 25 (4th ed. 1951).
2 Prosser, Law of Torts, 667 § 100 (2nd ed., 1955).
8Rothbard v. Ringler, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1947). In Malone v.
Belcher, 216 Mass. 209, 103 N. E. 637 (1913), an attachment was issued,
seemingly to collect a brokerage commission which the defendant claimed.
In fact, however, the real purpose of issuing the attachment was to prevent
the plaintiff from transferring the realty and thus enable the defendant to
acquire it for himself. The Court held that this was abuse of process.

4 Ibid.
5 Wood v. Graves, 144 Mass. 365, 11 N. E. 567, 59 Am. Rep. 95 (1887);
Gabriel v. Borowy, 324 Mass. 231, 85 N. E. 2d 435 (1949); Abernathy v.
Burns, 210 N. C. 636, 188 S. E. 97 (1936); Barnette v. Woody, 242 N. C. 424,
88 S. E. 2d 223 (1955).
6 Mayer v. Walter, 64 Pa. 283 (1870); Glidewell v. Murray-Lacy & Co., 124
Va. 563, 98 S. E. 665, 4 A. L. R. 225 (1919); Ross v. Peck Iron & Metal Co.,
264 F. 2d 262 (4th Cir. 1959).
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use which the process neither warranted, intended, nor authorized; (2) the defendant must have had an ulterior motive or
purpose in exercising such illegal, perverted, or improper use of
the process; 78 and (3) the plaintiff must sustain damage from this
irregularity.
Action for abuse of process must be distinguished from an
action for malicious prosecution. The action for abuse of process
hinges on the misuse of a regularly issued process, while malicious prosecution has reference to the wrong issuance of a process.9 In a case for malicious prosecution, malice, want of probable cause, and termination in favor of the plaintiff of proceedings
on which the action was based, must be alleged and proved. This
is not the case with abuse of process. Here an action can lie for
improper use of the process after it has been issued, and not for
maliciously causing the process to issue.10 As distinguished from
malicious prosecution and false imprisonment, abuse of process is
an independent cause of action."'
Some jurisdictions differentiate abuse of process and malicious prosecution, holding that an action for abuse of process
cannot be maintained for maliciously causing the process to
issue.' 2 According to Ohio law, there is no distinction between
abuse of process and malicious prosecution. There abuse of
process is malicious prosecution, and malicious prosecution is
abuse of process.1 3 Where a differentiation is made, the plaintiff
does not have to prove a lack of probable cause nor termination
4
of the proceeding in his favor.'
Regardless of whether the action for malicious prosecution is
for criminal or civil proceedings, it does not provide a remedy
for a group of cases in which legal procedure has been started in
7 Morfessis v. Baum, 281 F. 2d 938 (D. C. Cir. 1960); Coplea v. Bybee, 290

Ill. App. 117, 8 N. E. 2d 55 (1937); Brown v. Robertson, 120 Ind. App. 434,
92 N. E. 2d 856 (1950); Pimentel v. Houk, 101 Cal. App. 2d 884, 226 P. 2d 739
(1951). In Vanga v. Pareles, 137 Conn. 663, 81 A. 2d 112 (1951), the Court
held that while an ulterior motive is often present, it is not an essential
element for a cause of action.
8 Italian Star Line v. U. S. Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 53 F. 2d
359, 80 L. A. R. 576 (2d Cir. 931).
9 Clikoss v. Long, 231 Ala. 424, 165 So. 394 (1936).
10 Abernathy v. Burns, supra note 5; Ledford v. Smith, 212 N. C. 447, 193
S. E. 722 (1937).
11 Glidewell v. Murray-Lacy & Co., supm, note 6.
12

80 A. L. R. 581.

13 Pope v. Pollock, 46 Ohio St. 367, 21 N. E. 356, 4 L. R. A. 255 (1889);
Detwilder Co. v. Holly, 3 Ohio L. A. 121 (Ohio App. 1925).
14 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 2.
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proper form with probable cause, and even with ultimate success, and nevertheless has been perverted to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not intended. 15 Thus, in the leading English case, 16 the defendant had the plaintiff arrested under
civil process to force him to surrender the register of a vessel
without which the defendant well knew the plaintiff could not
sail. Although action for malicious prosecution could not be
maintained, because the proceeding had not been terminated, the
court refused to allow the process to be misused for such an end,
and held the defendant liable. This decision has been widely followed, and the tort of abuse of process is a well established one.
In Weiss v. Hunna,1 7 the plaintiff brought an action against
an Austrian attorney, maintaining that while the latter was prosecuting Austrian litigation against the plaintiff and obtaining an
injunction, defendant was not really acting in the name of plaintiff's mother, as the defendant alleged, but was really representing the interests of some unnamed clients. Plaintiff further
claimed that the defendant's purpose in pursuing this litigation
(allegedly in the name of plaintiff's mother) was specifically designed to prevent the plaintiff from delivering certain shares of
stock before a certain deadline. As a result of this misuse of a
legally issued process the stocks were eventually sold at a lower
price, to the unnamed clients, assuring the latter of control of a
certain corporation and damaging the plaintiff. The gravamen' s
of the misconduct was not the wrongful initiation of criminal or
civil procedure. Rather it was the misuse of the process (no
matter how properly it was obtained) for purposes other than
those for which it was intended. In other words, it is immaterial
that the process was issued properly, or that it was obtained in
the course of proper proceedings which were started and brought
with proper probable cause and for a proper purpose, or even
that the proceeding terminated in favor of the party instituting
the proceeding. What does matter is the subsequent misuse of the
process.19
It is of no consequence that if plaintiff had been required
to rely on Austrian law the complaint could properly have been
15 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 2.
16 Grainger v. Hill, 4 Bing. N. C. 212, 132 Eng. Rep. 769 (1838).
17 312 F. 2d 711 (2d Cir. 1963).
18 The burden or gist of a charge; the grievance or injury especially complained of.
19 Amer. Law Inst., Restatement of Torts, § 682.
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dismissed because (1) the plaintiff was guilty of a tort under
Austrian law, (2) the tort of wrongful use of process does not
involve such elementary principles that New York Courts would
simply assume it to be recognized in a country not following the
common law,2 0 and (3) New York might regard it as an abuse
of discretion to use judicial notice (New York Civil Practice
Act §344-a) of a civil law system when the party who had the
21
burden has not adequately assisted the Court to learn of it.

In Ludwig v. Penny,22 the court held that abuse of process
is the willful and wrongful use of the process itself, and does
not require a termination of the suit in issue to make it actionable. Abuse of process means perversion of process to accomplish some illegal purpose for which the process was not legally
2 3

intended.

A recent case held that attachment of $800 by a creditor in
24
order to collect a debt of $356 is not abuse of process.
25
In Jones v. Van Bever, the court held a sheriff liable for
the act of his deputy where the deputy, provided with a properly
issued warrant of arrest, abused the writ by arresting the wrong
person by mistake, or where, having an execution on the goods
of one person, he seized the goods of another by mistake.
Abuse of process implies an irregular and improper use of
the process, not merely the regular and proper use with a bad
motive. 26 If it is the intention of the user of the process to use it

for bad purposes, but it is used in a regular manner, this is not
considered to be an abuse of the process.27 To constitute the tort
it is not enough that the offender have an ulterior motive in using
the process of court, but it also must be shown that he used the
process for a purpose other than that for which it was intended,
Cuba R. R. v. Crosby, 222 U. S. 473, 32 S. Ct. 132, 56 L. Ed. 274 (1912);
Riley v. Pierce Oil Corp., 245 N. Y. 152, 156 N. E. 647 (1927); Industrial Export & Import Corp. v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 302 N. Y. 342,
349-350, 98 N. E. 2d 466, 469-470 (1951); International Film Distribution
Establishment v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 14 Misc. 2d 203, 155 N. Y. S. 2d
767 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
21 Sonnesen v. Panama Transport Co., 298 N. Y. 262, 82 N. E. 2d 659 (1948);
Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 233 F. 2d 541, 544 (2 Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U. S. 872 (1956).
22 73 S. E. 228 (N. Car. 1911).
23 Dixon v. Smith-Wallace Shoe Co., 283 Ill. 234, 119 N. E. 265, 268 (1918).
24 Quaranto v. Silverman, 187 N. E. 2d 857 (Mass. Supr. Jud. 1962).
25 164 Ky. 80, 174 S. W. 795 (1915).
26 Jeffery v. Robbins, 73 Ill. App. 353 (1897).
27 Crews v. Mayo, 165 Cal. 493, 132 P. 1032 (1913).
20
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e.g., achieving a collateral object. If this can be proved, the of28
fender has committed an actionable tort.

The existence of an ulterior motive sometimes may be inferred from the fact that the process has been misused or misapplied.2 9 However, the reverse is not true. If the act of the
prosecutor is in itself regular, the motive, whether ulterior or
otherwise, is immaterial.30 Ulterior motive or bad intention in
using the process is not sufficient per se.3 1 The bad intent must
32
culminate in the abuse. This is really the gist of the action.
An action cannot be maintained if the process was used to
perform a function intended by the law.3 3 In other words, mere

34
issuance of the process is not actionable as an abuse of process.
35
The process must be misused, or used beyond the scope of the
6
process, in order to make its use improper.3
An action for abuse of process can be maintained only where
there has been an injury to a person or property; 37 indirect injury to a person's business or to his good name is in itself not
actionable.3 8 The view has been taken that in an action for abuse
of process the property of the plaintiff must actually be seized
39
or the individual be arrested.

Hauser v. Bartow, 273 N. Y. 370, 7 N. E. 2d 268 (1937).
Hall v. Hollywood Credit Clothing Co., 147 A. 2d 866 (Mun. Ct. App. D. C.
1959); Jeffery v. Robbins, supra note 26.
30 Pimentel v. Houk, supra note 7; Jeffery v. Robbins, supra note 26; Saliem
v. Glovsky, 132 Me. 402, 172 A. 4 (1934); Priest v. Union Agency, 174 Tenn.
304, 125 S. W. 2d 142 (1939).
31 Keithley v. Stevens, 338 Ill. 199, 87 N. E. 375 (1909); Brown v. Robertson,
supra note 7; McClenny v. Inverarity, 80 Kan. 569, 103 P. 82 (1909); Glidewell v. Murray-Lacy & Co., supra note 6.
32 Earl v. Winne, 34 N. J. Super 605, 112 A. 2d 791 (1955); Melton v. Rickman, 225 N. C. 700, 36 S. E. 2d 276, 162 A. L. R. 793 (1945).
33 Waters v. Winn, 142 Ga. 138, 82 S. E. 537 (1914); Malone v. Belcher, supra
note 3; Martin v. Sanford, 129 Neb. 212, 261 N. W. 136, 100 A. L. R. 179
(1935); Jerome v. Shaw, 172 N. C. 862, 90 S. E. 764 (1916); Priest v. Union
Agency, supra note 30.
34 Hall v. Hollywood Credit Clothing Co., supra note 29; Edmonds v. Delta
Democrat Publishing Co., 230 Miss. 583, 93 So. 2d 171 (1957).
35 Earl v. Winne, supra note 32.
36 Brashear v. West, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 608, 8 L. Ed. 801 (1833); Pimentel v.
Houk, supra note 7; Priest v. Union Agency, supra note 30.
37 Earl v. Winne, supra note 32.
38 Baird v. Aluminum Seal Co., 250 F. 2d 595 (3d Cir. 1957); Bartlett v.
Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 14 A. 518 (1888); Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224,
28 N. W. 2d 780, 173 A. L. R. 819 (1947); Nelson v. National Casualty Co.,
179 Minn. 53, 228 N. W. 437, 67 A. L. R. 509 (1929).
39 Baird v. Aluminum Seal Co., supra; Siebrand v. Eyerly Aircraft Co., 185
F. Supp. 538 (D. C. Or. 1960); Bartlett v. Christhilf, supra n. 38; Pittsburgh,
(Continued on next page)
28
29
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Abuse of process is the use of the process for a purpose "not
contemplated by the law." 40 It is a malicious misapplication of
a regularly issued process, which an individual uses to secure
41
a result which is otherwise not lawful or properly obtainable.
The test is to determine whether the process was used to accomplish an end which was without the regular purpose of that process, or which compelled the party against whom the process was
used to do some collateral thing which he could not otherwise
42
have been legally or regularly compelled to do.
Abuse of process in some states is termed malicious abuse of
process. 43 The alternate use of such redundant expressions is not
usually intended to be discriminatory, 44 even though some jurisdictions indicate that it is not necessary to establish malice, 45 or
want of probable cause. 46 However, other jurisdictions hold that
malice 4 7 and want of probable cause 4 8 are essential elements of
the cause of action.
To maintain an action for abuse of process, the plaintiff must
prove willful and intentional misuse of abuse of the process to
accomplish some wrongful object or ulterior purpose not intended
(Continued from preceding page)
J. E. & E. R. Co. v. Wakefield Hardware Co., 138 N. C. 174, 50 S. E. 571
(1905); Garland v. Wilson, 289 Pa. 272, 137 A. 266 (1927). Where plaintiff's
property was levied and he lost dominion over it, abuse of process was
maintained, even though the goods were neither removed nor sold and the
levy was later abandoned. Adelman v. Rosenbaum, 133 Pa. Super. 386, 3 A.
2d 15 (1938).
40 Edwards v. Jenkins, 247 N. C. 565, 101 S. E. 2d 410 (1958).
41 Rothbard v. Ringler, supra note 3.
42 Coplea v. Bybee, supra note 7.
43 Coplea v. Bybee, supra note 7; Glidewell v. Murray-Lacy & Co., supra
note 6. In Grimstad v. Lofgren, 105 Minn. 286, 117 N. W. 515 (1908) the
action is called malicious abuse of process.
44 Glidewell v. Murray-Lacy & Co., supra note 6.
45 Peterson v. Wilson, 88 Cal. App. 2d 617, 199 P. 2d 757, 6 A. L. R. 2d 258
(1948); Wicker v. Hotchkiss, 62 Ill. 107 (1871); Klander v. West, 205 N. C.
524, 171 S. E. 782 (1933); Morphy v. Shipley, 351 Pa. 425, 41 A. 2d 671 (1945)-;
Kool v. Lee, 43 Utah 394, 134 P. 906 (1913).
46 Hall v. Field Enterprises, Inc., supra note 29; Baldwin v. Davis, 188 Ga.
587, 4 S. E. 2d 458 (1939); Coplea v. Bybee, supra note 7; Foy v. Barry, 87
App. Div. 291, 84 N. Y. S. 335 (1963); Abernathy v. Burns, supra note 5;
Morphy v. Shipley, Ibid n. 45; Kool v. Lee, Ibid n. 45; 14 A. L. R. 2d 323,
§ 17. See Restatement, Torts § 682, Comment a.
47 Nix v. Goodhill, 95 Iowa 282, 63 N. W. 701 (1895); Malone v. Belcher,
supra note 3; Keller v. Butler, 246 N. Y. 249, 158 N. E. 510, 55 A. L. R. 349
(1927).
48 Nix v. Goodhill, supra n. 47; Bore v. Condon, 87 Md. 368, 39 A. 1042
(1898); Keller v. Butler, Ibid, n. 47; Tucker v. Davis, 77 N. C. 330 (1877);
Norcross v. Otis Bros. & Co., 152 Pa. 481, 25 A. 575, 14 A. L. R. 2d 324 § 17
,(1893).
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by the law. 49 Such misuse of the law usually implies malice,50
because unlawful, willful acts are considered malicious by those
whom these acts injure. 51 Similarly, want of probable cause is
not essential, because there can be no such thing as probable
cause for a willful or intentional misuse of process for a wrongful or unlawful object, or for an ulterior purpose not intended
52
by the law.
The abuse is considered to be the unlawful method used to
do the act. Thus, intentional use of such method constitutes
malice in law, 53 and the action can be maintained if the plaintiff
can prove that the process was used under circumstances which
amount to actual 54 or implied malice. 55
56
The plaintiff must further show that the abuse injured him,
or compelled him to do, to his injury, something he would not
otherwise have had to do.57 No action can be maintained if the
plaintiff cannot prove that the process was used under circumstances amounting to actual or implied malice. 58 However, direct
evidence of an ulterior motive in the use of the process is not
necessary, as such motive may be inferred from its improper use.
Using a legal writ or process to seize property, to harass, or
to injure an owner or possessor of property5 9 constitutes an actionable abuse of process; for example, actively preventing the
conveyance of property to an intended individual. 60 Use of a
49 Psinakis v. Psinakis, 221 F. 2d 418 (3d Cir. 1955); Nix v. Goodhill, supra
note 47; Marlotte v. Weickgenant, 147 Mich. 266, 110 N. W. 1061 (1907);
Glidewell v. Murray-Lacy & Co., supra note 6; 80 A. L. R. 582.
50 Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 317 P. 2d 613 (1957); Phoenix Mutual
L. Ins. Co. v. Arbuckle, 52 Ill. App. 33 (1893); Kool v. Lee, supra note 45.
51 Clikos v. Long, supra note 9; Tranchina v. Arcinas, 78 Cal. App. 2d 522,
178 P. 2d 65 (1947); Shatz v. Paul, 7 Ill. App. 2d 223, 129 N. E. 2d 348 (1955);
Coplea v. Bybee, supra note 7; Page v. Cushing, 38 Me. 523 (1854).
52 Kool v. Lee, supra note 45.
Shatz v. Paul, supra note 51; Ledford v. Smith, supra note 10.
54 Where malice cannot be inferred, it must be proved. Humphrey v. Sutcliffe, 192 Pa. 336, 43 A. 954 (1899).
55 Glidewell v. Murray-Lacy & Co., supra note 6.
56 Gore v. Gorman's Inc., 148 F. Supp. 241 (D. C. Mo.), appeal dism. 244 F.
2d 716 (8th Cir. 1957); Italian Star Line v. U. S. Shipping Bd. Emergency
Fleet Corp., supra note 8.
57 Earl v. Winne, supra note 32.
58 Glidewell v. Murray-Lacy & Co., supra note 6.
53

59 Nix v. Goodhill, supra note 47; Pittsburgh, J. E. & E. R. Co. v. Wakefield
Hardware Co., supra note 39.
60 Malone v. Belcher, supra note 3.
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process to enforce payment of a judgment known to be false,
61
fraudulent, or nonexistent, would also be actionable.
An attorney can be held liable in an action for damages for
abuse of process if it can be shown that the acts complained of
are his own or of one whose purpose he investigated or knowingly carried out.0 2 He may also be held personally liable if he
maliciously participates with others in the abuse of the process,
or again if he maliciously encourages or induces another to act
63
for him in committing an act constituting an abuse of process.
* Malice or willfulness in the abuse of process cannot be inferred from mere mistake; 64 therefore good faith is a valid defense. 65 A person guilty of abuse of process can derive no advantage by claiming that the injured party did not do everything
possible to prevent the wrong.
The plaintiff may recover whatever actual damages he has
66
suffered as a natural and probable consequence of the tort, in67
cluding any special or peculiar damages, if such are pleaded.
68
exSpecial damages may include physical or mental injury,
financial
or
property,
injury
to
business,
penses, loss of time, and
standing. 69
Where the abuse of process is accompanied by malice, exemplary or punitive damages may be awarded. 70 A proper basis
61 Shipe v. Schenk, 158 A. 2d 910 (Mun. App. D. C. 1960); Atlanta Ice &
Coal Co. v. Reeves, 136 Ga. 294, 71 S. E. 421 (1911); Little v. Sowers, 167
Kan. 72, 204 P. 2d 605 (1949); Ankliff v. June, 81 Mich. 477, 45 N. W. 1019
(1890).
62 Little v. Sowers, Ibid n. 61; Hoppe v. Klapperich, supra note 38; Ash v.
Cohn, 119 N. J. L. 54, 194 A. 174 (1937); Dishaw v. Wadleigh, 15 App. Div.
205, 44 N. Y. S. 207 (1897); Adelman v. Rosenbaum, supra note 39.
63 Hoppe v. Klapperich, supra note 38.
64 Clikos v. Long, supra note 9.
65 Saliem v. Glovsky, supra note 30; Blair v. Maxbass Sec. Bank, 44 N. D.
12, 176 N. W. 98 (1919).
66 Giddings v. Freedley, 128 F. 355 (2d Cir. 1904); McGann v. Allen, 105
Conn. 177, 134 A. 810 (1926); Malone v. Belcher, supra note 3; Barnett v.
Reed, 51 Pa. 190 (1865). See Restatement, Torts, § 682.
67 McClenny v. Inverarity, supra note 31.
68 Spellens v. Spellens, supra note 50; McGann v. Allen, Ibid; Saliem v.
Glovsky, supra note 30; Adelman v. Rosenbaum, supra note 39.
69 Saliem v. Glovsky, supra note 30; Malone v. Belcher, supra note 3;
Barnett v. Reed, supra note 66.
70 Spellens v. Spellens, supra note 50; McGann v. Allen, supra note 66;
Tapley v. Taumans, 95 Ga. App. 161, 97 S. E. 2d 365 (1957); Wanzer v.
Bright, 52 Ill. 35 (1869); Sherman v. Dutch, 16 Ill. 283 (1855); Sokolowske
v. Wilson, 211 Iowa 1112, 235 N. W. 80 (1931); Saliem v. Glovsky, supra
(Continued on next page)
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171

for punitive damages exists, for example, where property normally exempt from execution is seized in order to break up a
71
person's business.
It is a mistake to lump abuse of process together with malicious prosecution. The two torts are clearly distinguishable, and
each merits detailed treatment by the law.
(Continued from preceding page)
note 30; Barnett v. Reed, supra note 66; Adelman v. Rosenbaum, supra note
39. But see Malone v. Belcher, supra note 3, where the court held that
exemplary damages are not recoverable.
71 Coleman v. Ryan, 58 Ga. 132 (1877).
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